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During the summer of 2008, archaeologists uncovered some remnants 
of musical prehistory in the caves of Hohle Fels, Germany. There, among 
burnt animal bones and flint–knapping debris, they found fragments of 
three flutes (Conard, Malina, and Münzel 2009). One was remarkably 
complete. This delicate instrument, discovered in twelve pieces, had been 
fashioned from a vulture’s wing bone. It was thirty–four centimeters long 
(roughly the length of a piccolo), with several finger holes and a notched 
mouthpiece (like the Japanese shakuhachi and other end–blown flutes; see 
Figure 1). The other flutes at the site were less complete but represented 
more complex manufacturing. They were made from pieces of mammoth 
tusk that had been split, hollowed out, and then rejoined. Yet headlines 
about the Hohle Fels flutes focused on neither their present condition nor 
their refined construction. Instead journalists and scholars emphasized 
the artifacts’ age. These flutes were more than thirty–five thousand years 
old—the earliest musical instruments then known.1 Incidentally, one of the 
earliest examples of figurative art, an ivory sculpture called the “Venus of 
Hohle Fels,” was found less than a meter away from the bone flute (Conard 
2009). Together these artifacts give compelling evidence for musical and 
artistic practices in the Upper Paleolithic Era. Writing and the wheel, by 
contrast, would not appear until almost thirty thousand years later, during 
the early Bronze Age (that is, around the fourth millennium BCE).
Figure 1: Bone flute from the caves of Hohle Fels. Photo © H. Jensen, Universität 
Tübingen. Used with permission.
Of course, such evidence is always incomplete, and these instru-
ments reveal only traces of Paleolithic music making. Their sounds 
and social functions have not been preserved. They are tokens of a 
culture that can be reconstructed only provisionally, through a kind 
of principled speculation. For example, given the flutes’ technological 
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sophistication, it is unlikely that they are the first instruments of their 
kind. Earlier specimens have surely been lost, presumably including 
instruments made from less durable materials. Indeed, a multidisci-
plinary review of archaeological evidence for the emergence of music, 
language, and symbolic behavior concludes that 
such instruments must, even at around 35,000 years, be several 
conceptual stages removed from the earliest origins, even of instru-
mental musical expression, to say nothing of those universal vocal, 
manual–percussive and dance forms which must have existed inde-
pendently of—and before—any need for such tools. (d’Errico et al. 
2003, 46)
“And before.” With this aside, the review’s twelve coauthors sug-
gest that musicality originated with the body alone, that instrumental 
play came after singing. This claim is ubiquitous in writings on music 
and human evolution. Ian Cross (2007, 663), for example, argues that 
“the use of musical artifacts will have been preceded by the expression 
of musical capacities by voice and body.” The idea has a long history. 
Charles Darwin himself wrote, “With man song is generally admitted 
to be the basis or origin of instrumental music” (1871, 2:333). But 
this idea already appears in the eighteenth century in Jean–Jacques 
Rousseau’s reflections on human and musical origins.
This essay critically examines claims for the precedence of voice 
in musical prehistory, juxtaposing Rousseau and twenty–first–century 
authors. Though centered on music and evolution, this investigation 
more generally explores voice–instrument relations and their implica-
tions for a philosophy of musical technology—or, more precisely, mu-
sical “technics.” The term “technics” refers to technical matters in the 
broadest sense. It is an English equivalent to the German “Technik” or 
the French “la technique,” which, depending on context, may be trans-
lated as either “technique” or “technology.” Lewis Mumford’s (1934) 
Technics and Civilization, for example, explores the interplay of tech-
nology and technique, bringing out continuities between hand tools 
and machines. Technics thus includes—but is not limited to—modern 
technology. Philosophical work on technics, combined with research 
from paleoanthropology and psychology, will help complicate nar-
ratives of vocal precedence. They will suggest that music is essen-




Rousseau on Human Origins
Jean–Jacques Rousseau’s 1755 Discourse on the Origin of Inequality is con-
cerned, more generally, with the origin of humanity. “For how can the source 
of inequality among men be known,” asks Rousseau (1992, 12), “unless one 
begins by knowing men themselves?” To access humanity’s original state, the 
philosopher adopts a strategy that is common to other eighteenth–century 
writers: an anthropological fiction (e.g., Condillac 1746; see Thomas 1995, 45). 
He uses an imagined past to explore society and culture, law and freedom, lan-
guage and music. Rousseau sometimes bolsters this narrative with quasi–eth-
nographic evidence or claims for natural truth. But he can also be refreshingly 
clear about his speculations, which “must not be taken for historical truths, but 
only for hypothetical and conditional reasonings better suited to clarify the 
Nature of things than to show their genuine origin” (1992, 19).
Rousseau’s fantasy begins with “natural man” in an age of wild individual-
ism. At this time, he says, people’s only desires were physical—food, sleep, and 
sex. They did not live in families, much less larger social groups. An instinctive 
cry of nature provided some means of communication, but this was used only 
in emergencies, and humans had no everyday need for language. Tools were 
unnecessary, too:
The savage man’s body being the only [instrument] he knows, he employs it 
for various uses of which . . . our bodies are incapable; our industry deprives 
us of the [force] and agility that necessity obliges him to acquire. If he had 
an axe, would his wrist break such strong branches? If he had a [slingshot], 
would his hand throw a stone so hard? If he had a ladder, would he climb a 
tree so nimbly? If he had a horse, would he run so fast? (Rousseau 1992, 21; 
translation modified) 
In their natural state, Rousseau argues, humans were strong, self–sufficient, 
and happy.
Yet as the population grew and spread, people encountered rough weather 
and, for the first time, needed something outside of themselves. They needed 
fire—but also each other. In their new communities, people began to cook 
food, wear clothes, and build houses; they collaborated in activities like hunt-
ing and shared knowledge of new techniques and tools. With social pressure 
to communicate, the universal cry of nature gave way to conventional articula-
tions of voice, to a kind of language. All of this created a new kind of human. In 
Rousseau’s mind, it eventually separated savage people from civilized people, 
natural people from artificial people.
Rousseau’s narrative proposes a common origin for language, so-
ciety, and technics. Of course, as Jacques Derrida (1976, 199) observes, 
Rousseau’s “origin” is not truly the beginning but “the beginning of the 
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end.” The “original” origin is always just out of reach, receding in a process 
of supplementary différance.2 In other words, the origin of inequality, like 
original sin, is a second origin. It is natural man’s corruption by society 
and technics, a fall into artifice.
In Technics and Time, the French philosopher of technology Bernard 
Stiegler critiques Rousseau’s fiction by comparing it to another human ori-
gin story: the Greek myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus. When the gods 
created mortal creatures, these two brothers were given the important task 
of endowing the new beings with different qualities. Epimetheus would 
assign the qualities, and then Prometheus—the smarter brother—would 
inspect his work. Plato’s Protagoras recounts the myth:
To some creatures he [Epimetheus] gave strength, but not speed, while 
he equipped the weaker with speed. He gave some claws or horns, and 
for those without them he devised some other power for their preserva-
tion. To those whom he made of small size, he gave winged flight, or a 
dwelling underground; to those that he made large, he gave their size 
itself as a protection. And in the same way he distributed all the other 
things, balancing one against another. This he did to make sure that no 
species should be wiped out; and when he had made for them defenses 
against mutual destruction, he devised for them protection against the 
elements, clothing them with thick hair and tough skins, so as to with-
stand cold and heat . . . (1991, 13)
Yet Epimetheus made a foolish mistake. He used all of the qualities on 
animals, leaving nothing for people. When Prometheus came to inspect 
his brother’s work, he found humans naked and defenseless. They had 
no fur for warmth, no fangs for protection. Prometheus, of course, saved 
humanity by stealing from the gods. In Plato’s telling, he took not only fire 
but also technē. As Martin Heidegger (1977, 13) explains, “Technē is the 
name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman, but also for the 
arts of the mind and the fine arts.” This divine know–how compensates for 
the humans’ lack of qualities and makes it possible for them to exist.
Technics, in this myth, does not supplement humanity; it is a condi-
tion of humanity. In Stiegler’s terms, the human pursues “life by means 
other than life,” through “organized inorganic matter.” For Rousseau, by 
contrast, humanity was originally self–sufficient and powerful, needing 
neither tools nor artificial techniques. Stiegler (1998, 114–15) observes 
that “Rousseau . . . wants to show that there is no originary default, no 
prostheses, that the claws missing in man are not stones, or, should they be 
stones, they are precisely not cut or fabricated, being immediately at hand 
and not inscribed in any process of mediation.” Besides claiming that the 
body is natural man’s only instrument, Rousseau (1992, 20) assumes that 
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natural man always walked on two legs, “using his hands as we do ours.” 
But here Stiegler (1998, 113) senses a contradiction, since we humans use 
our hands to manipulate tools, and this capacity for manipulation seems 
to distinguish hands from paws. 
Here Stiegler invokes paleoanthropologist André Leroi–Gourhan 
(1911–1986). Considering early hominid fossils, Leroi–Gourhan (1993) 
argues that walking upright had profound effects on human evolution. It 
led to a bigger brain and a flexible vocal apparatus (see Mithen 2005, 147), 
and it freed the hands for gestural communication and tool use. From 
that point humans were co–evolving with their technology. This process 
was partially biological: human hands emerged in interaction with tools; 
the human digestive system emerged in interaction with cooked food; hu-
man toes in interaction with shoes. Yet technics also facilitated cultural 
evolution, the emergence of distinct social groups. Though many details 
in Leroi–Gourhan’s work are now out of date, the basic idea stands (see 
Odling–Smee, Laland, and Feldman 2003; and Malafouris 2013). Many 
scientists still link Paleolithic technology to “aspects of behavior, economy, 
mental capacities, neurological functions, the origin of grammatical lan-
guage, and social and symbolic systems” (Ambrose 2001, 1752).
On this level, Stiegler argues against Rousseau, asserting that tech-
nics is originary to humanity, not supplementary. But in other ways, 
he agrees with Rousseau. The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, for 
example, argues that natural man has no understanding of death, no 
understanding of temporality; natural man is supposedly immersed in 
“present existence without any idea of the future, however near it may 
be” (Rousseau 1992, 28). Human experiences of time, then, also begin 
with the second origin, with the development of tools and communities. 
This connection is explained by Stiegler’s central theses on technics and 
time—or, he would say, on technics as time. Technical objects represent 
an exteriorization of memory that outlasts the individual. This does not 
only happen with written records and other memory aids. Any technical 
object—say a stone handaxe or a bone flute—preserves traces of its users. 
Technics, then, provides access to a past through which we have not lived; 
it grounds the “historiality” (Geschichtlichkeit) of the world theorized by 
Heidegger (2010, 348–49). By forming the “already–there” into which we 
are inevitably thrown, technics makes cultural memory—and, indeed, 
culture itself—possible.
In sum, both Rousseau and Stiegler connect temporality, politics, and 
language to technology, to humanity’s relation to exteriority. Rousseau 
(1992, 66) asserts that “the Savage lives within himself; the sociable man, 
always outside of himself.” Stiegler, meanwhile, claims that this exteriority 
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constitutes the human. He concludes that “Rousseau’s narrative of the 
origin shows us through antithesis how everything of the order of what 
is usually considered specifically human is immediately and irremediably 
linked to an absence of property, to a process of ‘supplementation,’ of 
prosthetization or exteriorization, in which nothing is any longer imme-
diately at hand, where everything is found mediated and instrumental-
ized, technicized, unbalanced . . . Rousseau will not, therefore, have been 
mistaken; he will have been right, almost” (Stiegler 1998, 133).
The Technicization of Voice
Stiegler’s critique is easily extended to Rousseau’s writings on musical 
origins.3 In his Dictionary of Music (1768), Rousseau (1998, 375) says that 
“Song does not seem natural to man. Although the Savages of America 
sing, because they speak, the true Savage never sang.” Song, like speech, 
emerged with the second origin, when the cry of nature was transformed 
through social conventions. For Rousseau, then, music starts not with 
sound but with the voice. Furthermore, according to the 1781 Essay on 
the Origin of Languages, speech and song did not simply originate at the 
same time. In the past, Rousseau (1998, 318) claims, “there was no music 
at all other than melody, nor any other melody than the varied sound 
of speech.”4 Today, though, speech no longer sings, and song no longer 
speaks. These dual aspects of the voice grew apart in a process of techni-
cization that repeated the fall into artifice. Rousseau suggests that writing 
distanced language from the emotional presence of voice. With music, 
he attacks the bloodless conventionality of French opera, Jean–Philippe 
Rameau’s scientistic theories of harmony, and the denatured voices of 
castrati (see Derrida 1976, 195, 210–12; Christensen 1993; and Feldman 
2008, 180).
For present purposes, though, I am more interested in the Essay’s 
reference to an earlier stage in the technicization of voice, a stage before 
harmony:
From the time of Menalippides and Philoxenus, instrumental play-
ers—who were at first the employees of the Poets and worked only under 
them and, so to speak, at their dictation—became independent of them 
. . . Thus melody, beginning to no longer be so attached to discourse, 
imperceptibly assumed a separate existence, and music became more 
independent of the words. That was also when the wonders that it had 
produced when it was only the accent and harmony of poetry gradually 
ceased . . . (Rousseau 1998, 329)
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Here song is corrupted not by harmony but by instruments. Instrumental 
mélodie echoes vocal chant, while also distorting it (Waeber 2009, 109). 
Instruments supplement the voice, divorcing music from linguistic commu-
nication.5 They exteriorize, conventionalize, and constrain music, forming 
the eventual basis for harmony. “The system of the Greeks had absolutely no 
harmony in our sense,” Rousseau argues (1998, 328),
except what was required to tune instruments on perfect consonances. 
All peoples who possess stringed instruments are forced to tune them by 
consonances, but those who do not possess them have inflections in their 
songs which we call false because they do not enter into our system and 
because we cannot notate them.
Song can still imitate primal, passionate voices (and that, for Rousseau, 
is the source of whatever affective power it retains), but it is permanently 
“shackled” by the instrumental system.
This shackling may be illustrated with a moment from Rousseau’s most 
successful composition, Le devin du village (1752).6 The one–act opera be-
gins with the shepherdess Colette, who is weeping because her lover, Colin, 
has abandoned her. (After the piece’s premiere at court, Louis XV reportedly 
sang this air all day [Robinson 1992].) When Colette exclaims “Alas! Alas!” 
her melody mirrors the falling inflection of an actual sigh (see Example 1). 
For Rousseau, this imitation grounds the melody’s emotional appeal. Yet 
Colette’s cry is also forced into the artificial steps of a chromatic scale. It is 
not continuous but discrete, divided according to the intervallic system of 
the keyboard and Western notation. Here Rousseau the composer gestures 
toward purer forms of vocalization—both the prelinguistic cry of nature 
and pre–instrumental speech–song—that civilized humans can never fully 
recover.
Example 1: Rousseau, Le devin du village, “J’ai perdu tout mon bonheur,” mm. 43–46
Rousseau’s musical polemics, then, recapitulate his anthropological 
speculations: song has its own double origin in which voice was supple-
mented by instruments, immediate expression turned to technique, and 
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natural music gave way to artificial music. Again, the contradictions here 
are revealing. Rousseau imagines a voice before articulation and before 
conventions, even though the prominence of these features distinguishes 
human voices from animal vocalizations. As Rousseau (1998, 326) himself 
claims, “Birds whistle, man alone sings.” But from this perspective, there is 
no voice without vocal technique; technique constitutes the voice as such. 
Likewise, Rousseau idealizes a kind of song whose inflections are not con-
strained by intervals, even though intervallic spacing differentiates singing 
from expressive speech. Indeed, as Derrida (1976, 200) notes, Rousseau’s 
own definition of song in the Dictionary of Music invokes the interval, in-
dicating that intervallic spacing is not extraneous to song but “an originary 
accessory and an essential accident.” In the end, it appears that music—like 
the human—emerges through mediation, exteriorization, and instrumen-
talization. Rousseau’s quest for musical immediacy ultimately points to 
musical technics.
Language, Tool Use, and Music
Twenty–first–century writers on music and evolution often echo Rousseau. 
Steven Brown’s (2000) theory of “musilanguage” and what Steven Mithen 
(2005) calls “Hmmmmm”—an acronym for “holistic, multi–modal, 
manipulative, musical, and mimetic” communication—both imagine a 
prehistoric form of vocal expression that would be equally protomusical 
and protolinguistic. Emotion is generally considered central to such com-
munication (see Molino 2000, 171–72; Richman 2000; and Cross 2009). 
Furthermore, it aligns with the idea that “music is first and foremost vocal” 
(Molino 2000, 172. See also Lehmann 2010, 92). According to Nicholas 
Bannan (2012, 306), “vocal music, which arises directly from the potential 
of evolved anatomy, is far older than instrumental, which employs extra–
somatic tools.” Musical instruments may then be conceived as a supple-
ment to bodily musicality. For example, Ian Cross (2007, 663) understands 
instruments as “prosthetic devices,” “extending the sound–producing 
capacities of the human body (in terms of frequency range, intensity, and 
timbre).” Iain Morley (2013, 131) writes: “instruments constitute an acces-
sory to existing human capacities; the origins of musical behaviour would 
not have relied upon the invention of instruments.”7 Of course, these writ-
ers’ methodological and theoretical commitments differ significantly from 
Rousseau’s, and the individual authors may not subscribe to all of these 
claims. Nonetheless, at each point the philosopher haunts contemporary 
discourse on musical origins.
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These arguments often respond to perceived attacks from authors like 
Steven Pinker (1997, 534), who notoriously refers to music as evolutionary 
“cheesecake.” They aim to show that music is not merely a form of non–
adaptive pleasure seeking (Huron 2001, 45–46). They suggest instead that 
music is in our nature (e.g., Levitin 2008). To this end, scholars adopt vari-
ous strategies, considering social benefits of music making, vocalization in 
animals, musical universals, or connections between music, language, and 
other domains of human behavior.
Speech, song, and musilanguage, for example, would all rely on “vocal 
emancipation” (Merker 2012, 222), an advanced capacity for voluntarily re-
producing and varying vocal sounds. But this leads back to technics. For, as 
Merlin Donald argues, the “self–programmed” motor skills needed for pro-
tolanguage also support tool use. “All gestures and intentional vocalizations 
are ultimately actions of the musculature,” Donald (1999, 141) writes, “and 
to generate greater varieties of gestures and sounds, primate motor behav-
iour must somehow have become much more plastic, less stereotyped, and 
subject to deliberate rehearsal.” As such, he concludes that language evolu-
tion would require “a breakthrough in hominid motor evolution” (141). The 
ability to consciously refine skills through practice and to imitate others’ 
actions would facilitate both communication and tool–based action, tech-
niques of the body alone and techniques that incorporated external props. 
It would reflect the development of a mimetic system that would underlie 
“play, games, skilled rehearsal, nonlinguistic gesticulation, toolmaking, oth-
er creative instrumental skills, many nonsymbolic expressive devices used 
in social control, and reproductive memory in general” (Donald 1991, 193).
On a social level, mimetic skill would engender distinctively human 
forms of communication and cooperation based on shared intentionality 
(Donald 1991, 171). For Michael Tomasello (2008, 108), this is the central 
cognitive adaptation that distinguishes humans from other primates: un-
like chimpanzees and other apes, we understand conspecifics as agents with 
intentions and feelings like our own. This distinction is crucial to humans’ 
“capacity for culture” (Tomasello 1999, 325). Tomasello’s evidence from 
primate and developmental psychology aligns suggestively with anthro-
pological research by Tim Ingold. Drawing on ethnographic work with 
hunter–gatherer groups, Ingold (1993, 436–42) insists that the technical, 
like language, is always social and cooperative. Skill development is based 
in relationships between experts and novices (Ingold 2000, 37). It involves 
watching and copying, working or playing together. Tools, like gestures, 
then, already imply some intersubjective context of shared attention, un-
derstanding, and goals. In fact, an object is seen as a tool only when it is 
connected with some technique, some purpose (319).
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This research strongly suggests that human capacities for gesture, 
language, and complex tool use—for communicative and material inter-
ventions in the world—evolved together. But the preconditions for the 
emergence of gesture, language, and complex tool use are equally precon-
ditions for the emergence of singing and playing instruments.
The flutes of Hohle Fels demand practiced motor control and mi-
metic understanding. These instruments depended on the manual 
capacities that differentiated anatomically modern humans from other 
primates—mobile wrists, sturdy and flexible thumbs, and fleshy finger–
pads. To borrow two terms from Raymond Tallis (2003), the flute was not 
just “brachio–chiral,” involving the reaching, gesturing hand at the end 
of the arm; it required the precision of the “chiro–digital.” Prehistoric 
flutists, like their modern counterparts, used their fingers, covering holes 
in different combinations to produce a range of pitches and coordinating 
such movements with the mouth and breath. As Jeremy Montagu (2003, 
3) notes, this is not the easiest instrument to master: “with both end–
blown and notch flutes, the player has to be careful to hold the instru-
ment so that the air–stream impinges on the edge at precisely the right 
angle—otherwise there is only a hiss and no musical sound.” Stiegler 
(2009, 66–69) would further emphasize how these techniques combine 
somatic memory and technical memory, the interiorized memory of an 
individual and the exteriorized memory of the group.
Singing, too, requires muscular self–programming, and vocal skill, 
no less than tool use, is cultivated in some social context. All cultures 
have vocal music (Nettl 2000, 468), because the voice, as part of the body, 
is everywhere at hand. But there is no universal voice. As Curt Sachs 
(1961, 85) notes, “nowhere outside the modern West do people sing with 
a voice for which we have coined the honorific title of ‘natural.’” Singing 
always has an accent. The voice is always already technical.8 And so, in 
a sense, the musical voice has always been a mediated “vocal instru-
ment.” This is not to ignore differences between instrumental and vocal 
practices, which are substantial, nor to collapse the distinction between 
techniques of tool use and “techniques of the body” (Mauss 1973). It is, 
instead, to point out a paradoxical interrelation of instrument and voice 
that resembles the relation between writing and speech: to paraphrase 
Derrida (1976, 46), the musical instrument is at the same time exterior to 
the voice, not being a mere imitation of voice, and interior to the voice, 
which is already in itself instrumentalized or technicized.
All of this implies that human vocal ability would not precede the 
ability to make music with objects. Any early human that could learn to 
sing could also learn to drum with sticks or stones. Indeed, the capacity 
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to perceive and produce rhythms—with hands, feet, voices, or tools—is 
a key example of mimetic skill (Donald 1991, 186–87). Of course, the 
playing of instruments, in this view, does not necessarily coincide with 
the making of instrumental artifacts. After all, communities of hunter–
gatherers today often use found objects as musical instruments (Espi–
Sanchis and Bannan 2012). Or perhaps the primordial act of instrument 
making is simply the taking–up of an object as a means to music, the act 
of connecting a thing, whether found or fashioned, with some musical 
technique.
Coda
Again Rousseau will have been right, almost. On this account, song and 
speech, voice and tools would have a common origin. Vocal and instru-
mental skill would both be features of a musicality that is deeply entwined 
with the human capacity for culture (Cross 2008)—a capacity, in other 
words, for technics. While reassessing claims for vocal precedence in 
terms of technics can help today’s scholars avoid Rousseau’s metaphysical 
assumptions (that is, his “phonocentrism”), it can also bring narratives of 
musical origins into better accord with perspectives on human cognitive 
evolution from Donald, Tomasello, and others.
If voice and instrument are not opposed in a metaphysical binary, 
they may interact more freely. Just as flutes may imitate voices, voices 
may imitate flutes or drums. David Burrows (2007, 90) even suggests that 
“stability of pitch in singing . . . could conceivably result simply from 
imitating the behavior of xylophones and other such instruments in 
which pitch level is built in.” Interplay between vocal instruments and 
instrumental voices appears in countless repertoires—from jazz vocalise 
to pianistic cantabile, from konnakol vocal percussion in South–Indian 
classical music to the “mouth music” of eighteenth–century Scotland. 
Briefly consider a more recent example: beat–boxing often incorporates 
song and speech but is irreducible to either. The word “beat–box,” now 
a verb, originally referred to the drum machine itself. Beat–boxers vir-
tuosically interiorize the machine’s rhythms, incorporating drum sounds 
into their bodies, their voices. Beside Mithen’s “singing Neanderthals,” 
then, it might be useful to imagine “beat–boxing Cro–magnons.” Vocal 
percussion might be just as old as song.
Beat–boxing represents an instrumental mediation of voice that is 
grounded in technologies of sound reproduction. Yet before CDs or LPs, 
even before musical notation, musical instruments (including techni-
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cized voices) and their associated gestural programs help preserve musi-
cal materials. They contribute to the kind of technical memory theorized 
by Stiegler, as forms of inscription or “recording” that ground musical 
culture (see Gallope 2011, 61). Making music repeatable, such mediation 
builds associations that direct future perception (Stiegler 2011, 17–21). 
It shapes a musical “already–there.” This helps explain Stiegler’s radical 
claim, made while he was director of the French music research institute 
IRCAM, that there is no music without instruments (Donin and Stiegler 
2004, 7). This is to say, there is no music without technics.
From this perspective, Steven Pinker might, like Rousseau, be almost 
right. Pinker (1997, 529) writes that music, alongside art, religion, and 
philosophy, “is a technology, not an adaptation.”9 Saying that music is not 
adaptive does not mean that it is not functional, that it does not benefit 
individuals and communities who make it (see Fitch 2006); it would mean 
that music was not created through the competition of “selfish genes.” 
Arguments for music’s evolutionary significance, adaptive or otherwise, 
can easily replicate a dualistic metaphysics, trying to prove that music is 
natural not artificial for humanity. This essay suggests that it may be more 
productive to start from music’s technicity, considering the co–constitu-
tion of instrument and voice, tool and technique. Ultimately this points 
to an ontological proposition demanding further thought. What if music 
is not simply produced via technology? What would it mean for music 
itself to be a form of technics?10
Notes
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2011 Meeting of the Society for Music 
Theory in Minneapolis, as part of a special session organized by the SMT Music and Phi-
losophy Interest Group. I wish to thank Michael Gallope, Berthold Hoeckner, Brian Kane, 
Jairo Moreno, Lawrence Zbikowski, and the journal’s editorial board for their comments.
1. Reports about the Hohle Fels flutes in the popular press include Allen 2009, Devlin 2009, 
and Ghosh 2009. Though an older bone artifact was once thought to be a Neanderthal 
flute (see Kunej and Turk 2000), microscopic analysis reveals that its holes were not manu-
factured by humans but were produced by carnivore teeth (d’Errico and Villa 1997; and 
d’Errico and Lawson 2006). On more recent dating of musical artifacts, see Higham et al. 
2012.
2. The Derridean term différance is, characteristically for this philosopher, a pun. It en-
compasses two meanings of the French différer, both “to differ” and “to defer” (see Der-
rida 2011, 75).
3. Stiegler (1998, 116) does not investigate questions of vocality here, simply noting that 
Rousseau’s natural man “does not exteriorize himself, does not ex–press himself, does not 
speak: speech is already a prosthesis.”
4. Here Rousseau (1998, 318) mentions a classical source, Strabo’s Geography, which as-
sumes a common origin for poetry and song (see Strabo 2014, 50–51).
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5. Instrumental supplements are considered in recent philosophical work on voice: see 
Cavarero (2005, 68) on the flute of Marsyas, and Dolar (2006, 52–56) on the shofar. It is 
interesting that these examples involve wind instruments, which Rousseau (1998, 440) 
thought to be the earliest type of instrument.
6. For discussion of Rousseau’s musical career, including analysis of idiosyncratic passages 
from Le devin du village, see Gjerdingen 2007.
7. Christian Lehmann (2010, 101–2) even argues that musical instruments did not truly de-
velop until the invention of ancient Greek music theory.
8. For further discussion of the singing voice as technology, see Eidsheim 2008.
9. Pinker (1994) believes that language is an evolutionary adaptation, a claim that is highly 
debatable (see Huron 2001, 44; and Sampson 2005). Accordingly, Pinker (1997, 534) privileges 
language over music, claiming that music may be partially founded on pre–established linguis-
tic abilities.
10. For a response to Pinker that considers music as “transformative technology,” see Patel 
2008, 400–401.
References
Allen, Laura. 2009. “Oldest Musical Instrument Found.” Popular Science, June 24. www.popsci.
com/scitech/article/2009–06/oldest–musical–instrument–found.
Ambrose, Stanley H. 2001. “Paleolithic Technology and Human Evolution.” Science 291 (5509): 
1748–53.
Bannan, Nicholas. 2012. “Harmony and Its Role in Human Evolution.” In Music, Language, and 
Human Evolution, edited by Nicholas Bannan, 288–399. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brown, Steven. 2000. “The ‘Musilanguage’ Model of Human Evolution.” In The Origins of 
Music, edited by Nils L. Wallin, Björn Merker, and Steven Brown, 271–300. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.
Burrows, David L. 2007. Time and the Warm Body: A Musical Perspective on the Construction 
of Time. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
Cavarero, Adriana. 2005. For More Than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Christensen, Thomas. 1993. Rameau and Musical Thought in the Enlightenment. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Conard, Nicholas J. 2009. “A Female Figurine from the Basal Aurignacian of Hohle Fels Cave 
in Southwestern Germany.” Nature 459 (7244): 248–52.
Conard, Nicholas J., Maria Malina, and Susanne C. Münzel. 2009. “New Flutes Document the 
Earliest Musical Tradition in Southwestern Germany.” Nature 460 (7256): 737–40.
Condillac, Étienne Bonnot de. 1746. Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines. Amsterdam: 
Pierre Mortier.
Cross, Ian. 2007. “Music and Cognitive Evolution.” In The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary 
Psychology, edited by R. I. M. Dunbar and Louise Barrett, 649–68. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
   . 2008. “Musicality and the Human Capacity for Culture.” Musicæ Scientiæ 12 (1 suppl): 
147–67.
   . 2009. “The Evolutionary Nature of Musical Meaning.” Musicæ Scientiæ 13 (2 suppl): 
179–200.




D’Errico, Francesco, and Graeme Lawson. 2006. “The Sound Paradox: How to Assess the 
Acoustic Significance of Archaeological Evidence.” In Archaeoacoustics, edited by Chris 
Scarre and Graeme Lawson, 41–57. Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological 
Research.
D’Errico, Francesco, and Paola Villa. 1997. “Holes and Grooves: The Contribution 
of Microscopy and Taphonomy to the Problem of Art Origins.” Journal of Human 
Evolution 33: 1–31.
D’Errico, Francesco, Christopher Henshilwood, Graeme Lawson, Marian Vanhaeren, Anne–
Marie Tillier, Marie Soressi, Frédérique Bresson, Bruno Maureille, April Nowell, Joseba 
Lakarra, Lucinda Backwell, and Michèle Julien. 2003. “Archaeological Evidence for the 
Emergence of Language, Symbolism, and Music—An Alternative Multidisciplinary 
Perspective.” Journal of World Prehistory 17: 1–70.
Derrida, Jacques. 1976. Of Grammatology. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. 
Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press.
   . 2011. Voice and Phenomenon: Introduction to the Problem of the Sign in Husserl’s 
Phenomenology. Translated by Leonard Lawlor. Northwestern Studies in Phenomenology 
and Existential Philosophy. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Devlin, Hannah. 2009. “World’s Oldest Musical Instrument ‘Played Star Spangled Banner’.” The 
Times (UK), June 25. http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/
music/article6569682.ece.
Dolar, Mladen. 2006. A Voice and Nothing More. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Donald, Merlin. 1991. Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and 
Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   . 1999. “Preconditions for the Evolution of Protolanguages.” In The Descent of Mind: 
Psychological Perspectives on Hominid Evolution, edited by Michael C. Corballis and 
Stephen E. G. Lea, 138–54. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Donin, Nicholas, and Bernard Stiegler. 2004. “Le tournant machinique de la sensibilité 
musicale.” In Révolutions industrielles de la musique, edited by Nicholas Donin and 
Bernard Stiegler, 7–17. Cahiers De Médiologie / IRCAM 18. Paris: Fayard.
Eidsheim, Nina Sun. 2008. “Voice as a Technology of Selfhood: Towards an Analysis of 
Racialized Timbre and Vocal Performance.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of California–
San Diego.
Espi–Sanchis, Pedro and Nicholas Bannan. 2012. “Found Objects in the Musical Practices 
of Hunter–Gatherers: Implications for the Evolution of Instrumental Music.” In Music, 
Language, and Human Evolution, edited by Nicholas Bannan, 173–98. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Feldman, Martha. 2008. “Denaturing the Castrato.” The Opera Quarterly 24 (3–4): 178–99.
Fitch, W. Tecumseh. 2006. “The Biology and Evolution of Music: A Comparative Perspective.” 
Cognition 100 (1): 173–215.
Gallope, Michael. 2011. “Technicity, Consciousness, and Musical Objects.” In Music and 
Consciousness: Philosophical, Psychological, and Cultural Perspectives, edited by David 
Clarke and Eric F. Clarke, 47–64. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ghosh, Pallab. 2009. “‘Oldest Musical Instrument’ Found.” BBC News, June 25. http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8117915.stm.
Gjerdingen, Robert O. 2007. “Partimento, que me veux–tu?” Journal of Music Theory 51: 85–
135.
Heidegger, Martin. 1977. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. Translated by 
William Lovitt. New York: Harper & Row.




Higham, Thomas, Laura Basell, Roger Jacobi, Rachel Wood, Christopher Bronk Ramsey, and 
Nicholas J. Conard. 2012. “Τesting Models for the Beginnings of the Aurignacian and the 
Advent of Figurative Art and Music: The Radiocarbon Chronology of Geißenklösterle.” 
Journal of Human Evolution 62: 664–76.
Huron, David. 2001. “Is Music an Evolutionary Adaptation?” Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences 930: 43–61.
Ingold, Tim. 1993. “Tool–Use, Sociality, and Intelligence.” In Tools, Language and Cognition 
in Human Evolution, edited by Tim Ingold and Kathleen R. Gibson, 429–45. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
   . 2000. The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill. 
London: Routledge.
Kunej, Drago, and Ivan Turk. 2000. “New Perspectives on the Beginnings of Music: 
Archeological and Musicological Analysis of a Middle Paleolithic Bone ‘Flute.’” In The 
Origins of Music, edited by Nils L. Wallin, Björn Merker, and Steven Brown, 235–68. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lehmann, Christian. 2010. Der genetische Notenschlüssel: warum Musik zum Menschsein 
gehört. Munich: F. A. Herbig.
Leroi–Gourhan, André. 1993. Gesture and Speech. Translated by Anna Bostock Berger. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Levitin, Daniel J. 2008. The World in Six Songs: How the Musical Brain Created Human 
Nature. New York: Dutton.
Malafouris, Lambros. 2013. How Things Shape the Mind: A Theory of Material Engagement. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Mauss, Marcel. 1973. “Techniques of the Body.” Translated by Ben Brewster. Economy and 
Society 2: 70–88.
McDermott, Josh, and Marc Hauser. 2005. “The Origins of Music: Innateness, Uniqueness, 
and Evolution.” Music Perception 23 (1): 29–59.
Merker, Björn. 2012. “The Vocal Learning Constellation: Imitation, Ritual Culture, 
Encephalization.” In Music, Language and Human Evolution, edited by Nicholas Bannan, 
215–60. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mithen, Steven J. 2005. The Singing Neanderthals: The Origins of Music, Language, Mind and 
Body. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Molino, Jean. 2000. “Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Music and Language.” Translated 
by Steven Brown. In The Origins of Music, edited by Nils L. Wallin, Björn Merker, and 
Steven Brown, 165–76. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Montagu, Jeremy. 2003. “Why Ethno–Organology?” Paper presented at the Conference of The 
Galpin Society, American Musical Instrument Society, and the International Committee 
of Musical Instrument Museums and Collections, Edinburgh. jeremymontagu.co.uk/
ethnoorganology.pdf.
Morley, Iain. 2013. The Prehistory of Music: Human Evolution, Archaeology, and the Origins 
of Musicality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mumford, Lewis. 1934. Technics and Civilization. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.
Nettl, Bruno. 2000. “An Ethnomusicologist Contemplates Universals in Musical Sound and 
Musical Culture.” In The Origins of Music, edited by Nils L. Wallin, Björn Merker, and 
Steven Brown, 463–72. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Odling–Smee, F. John, Kevin N. Laland, and Marcus W. Feldman. 2003. Niche Construction: 
The Neglected Process in Evolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Patel, Aniruddh D. 2008. Music, Language, and the Brain. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Pinker, Steven. 1994. The Language Instinct. New York: Morrow.
36
Current Musicology
   . 1997. How the Mind Works. New York: Norton.
Plato. 1991. Protagoras,. Rev. ed. Translated by C. C. W. Taylor. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Richman, Bruce. 2000. “How Music Fixed ‘Nonsense’ into Significant Formulas: On 
Rhythm, Repetition, and Meaning.” In The Origins of Music, edited by Nils L. Wallin, 
Björn Merker, and Steven Brown, 301–14. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Robinson, Philip E. J. 1992. “Devin du village, Le.” The New Grove Dictionary of Opera. Grove 
Music Online. Oxford Music Online. Oxford University Press, www.oxfordmusiconline.
com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/subscriber/article/grove/music/O004634.
Rousseau, Jean–Jacques. 1992. Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (Second Discourse), 
Polemics, and Political Economy. Translated by Judith R. Bush, Roger D. Masters, 
Christopher Kelly, and Terrence Marshall. Vol. 3. Collected Writings of Rousseau. 
Hanover: University Press of New England.
   . 1998. Essay on the Origin of Languages and Writings Related to Music. Translated 
by John T. Scott. Vol. 7. Collected Writings of Rousseau. Hanover: University Press of 
New England.
Sachs, Curt. 1961. The Wellsprings of Music. Edited by Jaap Kunst. The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff.
Sampson, Geoffrey. 2005. The “Language Instinct” Debate. Rev. ed. London: Continuum. 
Strabo. 2014. The Geography of Strabo. Translated by Duane W. Roller. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Stiegler, Bernard. 1998. Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus. Translated by Richard 
Beardsworth and George Collins. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
   . 2009. Technics and Time, 2: Disorientation. Translated by Stephen Barker. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press.
   . 2011. Technics and Time, 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise. Translated 
by Stephen Barker. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Tallis, Raymond. 2003. The Hand: A Philosophical Inquiry into Human Being. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press.
Thomas, Downing A. 1995. Music and the Origins of Language: Theories from the French 
Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tomasello, Michael. 1999. The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
   . 2008. Origins of Human Communication. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Waeber, Jacqueline. 2009. “Jean–Jacques Rousseau’s ‘unité de mélodie’.” Journal of the 
American Musicological Society 62 (1): 79–143.
